Policy choices drive Bangladesh's recurring energy crisis, says Anu Muhammad
Bangladesh is facing gas shortages and four to five hours of daily load-shedding at the same time, economist and energy activist Anu Muhammad told The Daily Star. He traced the crisis to policies from the 1990s and the 2010 Power Sector Master Plan prepared by JICA, which prioritised LNG imports, coal and nuclear power. Imported LNG costs nearly 60 times domestic gas, he said, urging domestic gas development and rapid solar expansion.
Source
Bangladesh — govt & media · read the original report ↗
Desk check · some claims need care
What the desk checked (5)
- Bangladesh faces four to five hours of load-shedding daily alongside gas shortages — Attributed to Anu Muhammad in the interview; no independent data cited in source.
- The 2010 Power Sector Master Plan was prepared by JICA without any Bangladeshi expert on the committee — Claim made by the interviewee; source gives no documentary corroboration.
- Imported LNG costs nearly 60 times as much as gas from domestic exploration — Figure appears in source as the interviewee's assertion; no methodology or source provided.
- Vietnam added about 11,000 MW of solar capacity in a single year; Bangladesh's peak demand is around 17,000 MW — Figures stated by the interviewee in the source; not independently attributed.
- An Alternative Master Plan begun in 2015 and first published in July 2017 rejects LNG, coal and nuclear power — Internally consistent account by its co-author; dates appear in source.
Analysts’ view opinion
Framed narrowly, this is an interview about load-shedding; read strategically, it is an argument that Bangladesh has converted an energy problem into a national-security dependency. Anu Muhammad's core claim — that the 1990s policy turn and the JICA-drafted 2010 Power Sector Master Plan locked the country into imported LNG, coal and nuclear power while national institutions such as BAPEX and Petrobangla stayed weak — describes an energy mix whose supply, pricing and repair timelines sit largely outside Dhaka's control. Whether or not one accepts his cost figure, the structural point about import exposure is the kind of vulnerability defence planners, not just economists, tend to worry about. The counter-argument he does not fully engage is that import-led capacity was chosen because domestic exploration is slow, capital-intensive and uncertain.
- Import dependence is a strategic, not merely fiscal, exposure: the story describes two LNG terminals where a single breakdown can take a month or more to repair, meaning a small number of assets carry outsized national consequence.
- He argues external lenders and agencies — the World Bank, IMF, ADB and JICA — helped shape the policy framework, which raises the familiar question of how much sovereign policy space borrowing countries retain in critical infrastructure.
- His point that Chinese projects, US LNG engagement and Indian ties all expanded under the same government cuts against a simple 'pro-one-power' reading and instead suggests Bangladesh spread commercial dependencies across rival capitals.
- The claim that offshore blocks remain under-explored while Myanmar and India have found gas in similar structures makes maritime energy an issue of strategic neglect as much as geology.
- He asserts policy continuity survived a change of government, including under the interim administration — implying the drivers are institutional and economic rather than partisan, and unlikely to shift with leadership alone.
What to watch — Watch whether Dhaka signs further LNG terminal arrangements with existing operators or instead moves visibly to fund offshore exploration and strengthen BAPEX and Petrobangla — that choice will signal which strategic path is being locked in for the next decade.
This is one expert's critical assessment carried in an interview: the story does not present the government's or the named companies' responses, offers no independently verified figures on costs, coal-plant performance or nuclear shutdowns, and does not establish that his proposed domestic-gas-and-solar alternative could meet demand on the timelines required.
Deep dive
Research brief · 8 facts · 7 dates · exam-readyThe brief
Context
Bangladesh is simultaneously experiencing severe gas shortages and four to five hours of daily load-shedding. In an interview with The Daily Star dated 19 September 2026, economist and energy activist Anu Muhammad argues the crisis is rooted in policy choices dating to the 1990s, when the sector was opened to foreign private firms under the guidance of the World Bank, IMF, ADB and JICA, and in the 2010 Power Sector Master Plan prepared by JICA that pushed LNG imports, coal and nuclear power. He contends imported LNG costs nearly 60 times domestic gas, and calls instead for developing domestic gas through national institutions such as Petrobangla and BAPEX alongside a rapid solar expansion, as set out in the Alternative Master Plan his group began drafting in 2015.
Key facts
- Bangladesh faces four to five hours of load-shedding daily alongside continuous gas shortages, a simultaneous crisis Anu Muhammad says he has never seen before.
- The Production Sharing Contract (PSC) system was introduced in the early 1990s, bringing in foreign companies without comparable growth of national institutions.
- In 2010 Bangladesh enacted an indemnity law for energy sector steps and adopted the Power Sector Master Plan prepared by JICA, with no Bangladeshi expert on the committee, per Anu Muhammad.
- The 2010 PSMP directed three paths: LNG imports, coal-fired power and nuclear power, leaving renewable energy marginal.
- Imported LNG costs nearly 60 times as much as the same quantity of gas from domestic exploration, Anu Muhammad says.
- Bangladesh has two LNG terminals; when one breaks down, repairs can take a month to six weeks, with Excelerate Energy's terminal cited for repeated failures.
- Vietnam added about 11,000 MW of solar capacity in a single year during its energy crisis, while Bangladesh's peak demand is around 17,000 MW.
- Government long-term solar contracts at Tk 12 or Tk 14 per unit compare with Tk 4 or Tk 5 per unit in India, a potential long-term burden on the state.
Timeline
- 1980s onwardsSuccessive governments repeat the argument that Bangladesh lacks capacity and needs foreign companies.
- Early 1990sProduction Sharing Contract system introduced; foreign firms enter the energy sector under a neoliberal policy framework.
- 2009Soon after coming to power, the Sheikh Hasina government moves to sign the ConocoPhillips offshore deal; protests are suppressed and the deal signed. ConocoPhillips' share price rises.
- 2010Indemnity law for energy sector steps enacted and JICA-prepared Power Sector Master Plan adopted.
- 2015Work begins on an Alternative Master Plan, taking nearly two years.
- July 2017First draft of the Alternative Master Plan published.
- 19 September 2026Anu Muhammad's interview published in The Daily Star; the plan is being updated, with meetings planned this month and next.
Who has a stake
- Bangladeshi households and industry — Bear four to five hours of daily load-shedding and gas shortages that constrain electricity generation.
- Petrobangla and BAPEX — Have repeatedly proposed strengthening BAPEX's technical capacity; officials arguing for domestic capability are said to be marginalised or transferred.
- JICA, World Bank, IMF, ADB — Named as shaping the policy framework and ideas behind sector liberalisation; JICA prepared the 2010 PSMP.
- Foreign energy companies (ConocoPhillips, Excelerate Energy, US, Chinese firms) — Hold contracts, terminals and exploration rights; accountability for terminal breakdowns and unfulfilled work is questioned.
- Government of Bangladesh (current and former, including the interim government) — Faces demands to review projects, dismantle the underlying economic structure and lead the renewable transition.
- The Sundarbans and its dependents — The Rampal coal plant went ahead despite protests, severely affecting the largest mangrove forest and UNESCO World Heritage Site.
- BUET and technical universities — Their role in producing national energy expertise is questioned; students and teachers lack international exposure, he argues.
Why it matters
Bangladesh's energy trajectory shows how a development model built on imported fuel and foreign-led projects can leave a country simultaneously short of gas and electricity despite decades of investment and heavy borrowing. The argument that imported LNG costs nearly 60 times domestic gas, and that solar can be added at scale as Vietnam did, reframes the crisis as a question of institutional capacity and political priorities rather than geology. For India and the region, it is a case study in energy security, state capability and the cost of long-term take-or-pay style dependence on global price swings.
UPSC angle
Prelims pointers
- Power Sector Master Plan (PSMP) 2010 of Bangladesh was prepared by JICA and prioritised LNG imports, coal-fired and nuclear power.
- Production Sharing Contract (PSC) system was introduced in Bangladesh in the early 1990s.
- Petrobangla and BAPEX are Bangladesh's national energy institutions; BAPEX handles exploration.
- Rampal coal power plant is located near the Sundarbans, the largest mangrove forest and a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
- National oil companies cited as capacity-building models: ONGC (India), Petronas (Malaysia), Norway's post-1960s oil institutions.
- Bangladesh's peak electricity demand is around 17,000 MW; Vietnam added about 11,000 MW of solar in one year.
Mains framing
Bangladesh's simultaneous gas and power shortage illustrates how energy insecurity can be manufactured by policy design rather than resource scarcity. Anu Muhammad traces the causes to a neoliberal framework from the 1990s shaped with the World Bank, IMF, ADB and JICA, which opened the sector to foreign private capital while national institutions like Petrobangla and BAPEX were left underdeveloped; the 2010 indemnity law and the JICA-drafted Power Sector Master Plan then locked the country into LNG imports, coal and nuclear power with renewables kept marginal. The implications are fiscal (imported LNG costing nearly 60 times domestic gas, heavy borrowing, and solar contracts at Tk 12-14 per unit against Tk 4-5 in India), environmental (damage to the Sundarbans from Rampal, LNG site impacts), and strategic (exposure to global price swings and to just two LNG terminals whose repairs take up to six weeks). He also argues that policy continuity across governments, including the interim one, reflects entrenched interests of big business, bureaucracy and lenders, risking the replacement of one politically connected elite by another. The way forward he proposes is sequenced: short-term use of existing onshore assets such as Bhola and Chhatak gas after feasibility study, repairs to existing fields for output gains in two to four months, state-led national capacity for offshore exploration over four to five years with foreign firms hired only for specific technical tasks, and rapid solar expansion on rooftops and open space supported by duty reform, local panel manufacturing and state leadership rather than reliance on the private sector alone.
Key terms
- Power Sector Master Plan (PSMP) 2010
- JICA-prepared roadmap for Bangladesh's power sector that directed LNG imports, coal-fired power and nuclear power.
- Production Sharing Contract (PSC)
- Contract model introduced in Bangladesh in the early 1990s under which foreign companies explore and share output with the state.
- BAPEX
- Bangladesh's national exploration company; repeated proposals to expand its technical capacity have not been acted on, per the interview.
- Petrobangla
- State oil, gas and mineral corporation of Bangladesh, which has proposed strengthening national exploration capability.
- LNG as a bridge fuel
- The claim that imported liquefied natural gas can cover short-term shortages; criticised here as costly and creating long-term dependence.
- Alternative Master Plan
- Public-interest energy plan begun in 2015, first draft published July 2017, rejecting LNG, coal and nuclear in favour of domestic gas plus renewables.
Practice questions
- Critically examine the argument that Bangladesh's recurring energy crisis stems from policy choices rather than resource scarcity. What lessons does it offer for energy planning in South Asia?
- Discuss how dependence on imported LNG affects a developing country's fiscal position, environmental outcomes and energy security, using the Bangladesh case.
- "Countries do not acquire capacity by waiting for it to appear; they build it." Evaluate the role of state-owned national energy institutions in building technological self-reliance.
Grounded only in the source report — figures and dates are the source's, not inferred.