US-Uzbekistan trade and investment ties expand with new deals

Economic relations between the United States and Uzbekistan are expanding. In June, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer signed an early harvest of trade commitments in Tashkent, while the DFC launched a joint investment platform covering energy, infrastructure and critical minerals. In 2025, Uzbekistan announced an $8.5 billion deal for up to 22 Boeing 787 Dreamliners. Uzbek firm AFKA is building a 331-employee aluminium plant in Bowling Green, Kentucky. Uzbekistan-China trade reached $7.7-8.9 billion in the first half.

Written by AI from The Diplomat (Asia) · not yet reviewed by an editor · Published 20 Sept 2026, 7:48 pm IST

Source

The Diplomat (Asia) · read the original report ↗

#us-uzbekistan#trade#investment#critical minerals#central asia

Desk check · compared with the source

What the desk checked (5)

Tashkent announced an $8.5 billion deal in 2025 to buy up to 22 Boeing 787 Dreamliners. — Figure appears in source as an announced deal; no primary document cited.
Uzbek company AFKA is building an aluminium plant in Bowling Green, Kentucky, that will employ 331 people; groundbreaking was in July. — Specific figure and location stated in source without external attribution.
USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer visited Tashkent in June and signed an 'early harvest' of trade commitments. — Attributed to USTR with quoted language from the agreement.
Uzbekistan-China trade reached $7.7-$8.9 billion in the first half of the year. — Range given in source with no statistical agency named; treat as approximate.
A 2025 National Statistics Committee-World Bank study recorded the most poor residents in Samarkand (265,000), Fergana (239,000), Kashkadarya (238,000) and Andijan (214,000). — Attributed to a named joint study; figures appear in source.

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Analysts’ view opinion

AI Strategic Affairs Analyst

The widening U.S.-Uzbekistan economic relationship is less a trade story than an attempt by Washington to rebuild its footing in Central Asia amid great-power competition over critical minerals, energy and transport corridors. The Boeing order, the DFC joint investment platform and an Uzbek aluminium plant in Kentucky matter because two-way investment makes a partnership harder to unwind than one-way aid. But with Uzbek-China trade at $7.7-8.9 billion in just six months, this does not reorder Tashkent's hierarchy of partners; Uzbekistan is playing a deliberately multi-vector balancing game.

The emphasis on critical minerals, energy and logistics marks this as supply-chain security strategy as much as commerce.
That the U.S. envoy's talks reportedly happened on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Bishkek underlines that Tashkent will not tie itself exclusively to any one power.
Given China's far larger trade volumes, American leverage is likely to lie in quality, technology and development finance rather than sheer scale.
The absence of permanent normal trade relations under Jackson-Vanik has limited practical effect but remains a political signalling weakness.
Persistent poverty, unemployment and over a million annual labour migrants mean domestic legitimacy for this partnership depends on jobs reaching the regions, not just Tashkent.

What to watch — Watch the December Trump-Mirziyoyev meeting on the margins of the Miami G-20, whether the reciprocal trade and investment agreement is concluded, and how far the UzAuto privatisation and the proposed Air Products methanol investment advance.

The story does not establish whether the announced deals and proposed investments will actually be executed, how quickly they translate into jobs, or whether any defence or security cooperation accompanies them.

Deep dive

Research brief · 8 facts · 7 dates · exam-ready

The brief

Context

The United States and Uzbekistan have deepened economic and diplomatic engagement over the past two years, with new trade frameworks, investment platforms and large commercial contracts. Washington's renewed interest in Central Asia is driven largely by access to oil, gas and critical minerals, while Tashkent sees the moment as a chance to attract investors, diversify energy production and develop regions beyond the capital. The relationship remains constrained by the Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment and dwarfed by Uzbekistan's trade with China. Domestically, Uzbekistan faces poverty, unemployment and large-scale labour migration despite headline investment figures.

Key facts

In June, USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer visited Tashkent and signed an "early harvest of trade commitments"; Uzbekistan agreed to eliminate or reduce tariffs on US industrial and agricultural goods.
Also in June, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) launched the US-Uzbekistan Joint Investment Platform covering energy, infrastructure, critical minerals, transportation and logistics.
In 2025 Tashkent announced an $8.5 billion deal to buy as many as 22 Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft to modernise its commercial aviation industry.
Uzbek company AFKA broke ground in July on an aluminium solutions plant in Bowling Green, Kentucky; it will employ 331 people and is the first Uzbek manufacturing firm to operate in the US.
At the November 2025 summit between Trump and five Central Asian leaders, Washington pledged to explore partnership in the sale and privatisation of UzAuto Motors, plus a potential $3 billion Air Products methanol facility.
Uzbekistan aims to generate 54 percent of its power from renewable sources by 2030.
Uzbekistan-China trade reached between $7.7 and $8.9 billion in the first half of the year, far exceeding US-Uzbek trade.
A 2025 National Statistics Committee-World Bank study found the largest numbers of poor residents in Samarkand (265,000), Fergana (239,000), Kashkadarya (238,000) and Andijan (214,000) regions.

Timeline

2025Uzbekistan announces $8.5 billion deal for up to 22 Boeing 787 Dreamliners.
JuneUSTR Jamieson Greer signs early harvest of trade commitments in Tashkent; DFC launches US-Uzbekistan Joint Investment Platform.
JulyGroundbreaking ceremony for AFKA Aluminum Solutions plant in Bowling Green, Kentucky.
September 3President Mirziyoyev announces a new system to reduce poverty and unemployment nationwide.
Recent (date not stated)Mirziyoyev meets US special envoy Sergio Gor on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Bishkek, discussing critical minerals, energy and transport.
November 2025Trump holds summit with the five Central Asian leaders; UzAuto privatisation and Air Products methanol project flagged.
DecemberTrump and Mirziyoyev to meet next, with Mirziyoyev invited as a guest to the G-20 summit in Miami.

Who has a stake

Government of Uzbekistan (President Shavkat Mirziyoyev) — Wants investment, energy diversification, regional development beyond Tashkent, and jobs for a young workforce.
United States government (USTR, DFC, special envoy Sergio Gor) — Seeks access to Central Asian oil, gas and especially critical minerals, plus export markets for aircraft and industrial goods.
Boeing and US industry — An $8.5 billion order for up to 22 Dreamliners and potential contracts in energy, minerals and infrastructure.
AFKA and Bowling Green, Kentucky — First Uzbek manufacturing plant in the US, 331 jobs and stronger two-way commercial ties.
Uzbek population outside Tashkent — Poverty concentrated in Samarkand, Fergana, Kashkadarya and Andijan; over a million migrate abroad for work each year.
China — Remains Uzbekistan's dominant trade partner at $7.7-8.9 billion in the first half of the year.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) — Lending to upgrade public transport in Nukus, capital of Karakalpakstan.

Why it matters

Central Asia's critical minerals, oil and gas have made the region a theatre of great-power competition, and Uzbekistan — the region's most populous state with about 39 million people — is positioning itself as a partner rather than a prize. Whether expanding US trade and investment translates into jobs and better living standards outside Tashkent will determine if the partnership is genuinely win-win. For India, which also courts Central Asian connectivity and minerals, the episode shows how smaller states leverage multiple suitors without displacing China as the largest trade partner.

UPSC angle

Prelims pointers

Jackson-Vanik Amendment: US law denying Uzbekistan permanent normal trade relations; Tashkent gets temporary NTR via annual presidential waivers.
DFC = US International Development Finance Corporation; launched the US-Uzbekistan Joint Investment Platform in June.
Uzbekistan's renewable energy target: 54 percent of power generation by 2030.
Uzbekistan's population is around 39 million per a new census — the largest in Central Asia.
Nukus is the capital of the Republic of Karakalpakstan; its public transport upgrade is funded by an EBRD loan.
The recent SCO summit referred to in the story was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

Mains framing

The deepening US-Uzbekistan economic relationship illustrates how resource-rich but development-deficient states negotiate great-power interest. The immediate drivers are American demand for critical minerals, energy and transport infrastructure access, and Uzbekistan's need for capital, technology and export markets — visible in the June early harvest trade commitments, the DFC investment platform, the $8.5 billion Boeing order and the AFKA plant in Kentucky that makes investment two-way. Yet the limits are structural: the Jackson-Vanik Amendment still denies permanent normal trade relations (mitigated by annual waivers), and China's first-half trade of $7.7-8.9 billion means no new architecture of priority partners is likely. The deeper test is domestic. With roughly 39 million people, significant poverty concentrated in Samarkand, Fergana, Kashkadarya and Andijan, and over a million labour migrants annually, headline investment must convert into employment and regional development — hence projects in Khiva, Urgench and Nukus, the 54 percent renewables target by 2030, and Mirziyoyev's September 3 poverty and unemployment strategy. The way forward lies in aligning American commercial priorities with Tashkent's diversification and regional-development goals, and in transparent monitoring of the new welfare strategy against bureaucratic failure and corruption.

Key terms

Early harvest agreement: A partial, front-loaded set of trade commitments signed ahead of a fuller agreement — here on tariffs for industrial and agricultural goods.
DFC (US International Development Finance Corporation): America's development finance agency; it launched the US-Uzbekistan Joint Investment Platform in June.
Jackson-Vanik Amendment: US legislation that denies Uzbekistan permanent normal trade relations; Tashkent receives temporary status through annual presidential waivers.
Critical minerals: Minerals vital to modern industry and clean energy, now the focus of a 'race' for access in Central Asia.
Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment: The fuller trade pact Washington and Tashkent are working to conclude after the June early harvest.
Karakalpakstan: An autonomous republic within Uzbekistan whose capital, Nukus, is upgrading public transport with an EBRD loan.

Practice questions

Discuss how Central Asian states are leveraging great-power competition over critical minerals to advance their own development priorities, with reference to Uzbekistan.
"Rising trade and investment figures do not automatically translate into improved quality of life." Examine this in the context of Uzbekistan's regional poverty and labour migration.
Assess the constraints on US-Uzbekistan economic relations, including legacy legislation and the dominance of Chinese trade.

Grounded only in the source report — figures and dates are the source's, not inferred.

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